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Emile Durkheim and C. G. Jung: 
Structuring a Transpersonal Sociology of Religion
[Article originally appeared in the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1990, 29(4), 482-495.]
Susan F. Greenwood, retired  
University of Maine 
Religion is a prevalent theme in the works of both Emile Durkheim and C. G. Jung, who participated 
in a common intellectual milieu. A comparison of Durkheim’s collective consciousness and Jung’s 
collective unconscious reveals strikingly similar concepts. The components of these structures, 
collective representations and archetypes, illustrate interdependent sociological and psychological 
processes in the theorized creation of religious phenomena. An analysis of the constitutive elements 
in these processes offers a basis for structuring a transpersonal sociology of religion. 
, 32(2), 2013, pp. 42-52 
The works of Emile Durkheim and C. G. Jung and commentary upon their writing comprise a significant body of knowledge in sociology 
and psychology. Since both theorists deal with diverse 
topics, the intra- and inter-unifying significance of 
religion throughout their works does not immediately 
manifest itself. Yet religion is of paramount concern for 
both Durkheim and Jung (Pickering, 1984; Wehr, 1985/ 
1987). 
Religion, writes Durkheim (1893/1984), is an 
“outstanding form” (p. 227)  of the collective consciousness.1 
The collective consciousness contains sacred religious 
beliefs, or collective representations, and binds societies 
together through publicly acknowledged symbols and 
rites. The sacred thus represents that which is socially 
acceptable in religion. 
In counterpoint, Jung (1921/1974) writes that 
religion symbolizes an “inward movement of the libido 
into the unconscious” (para. 423). To forget the gods 
means to risk ignoring the archetypal forces of the 
collective unconscious (1928/1966, para. 163). Religion 
thus implies a “‘careful consideration’ of unknown 
dangers and agencies” (para. 164). Acknowledgment 
of both conscious and unconscious elements becomes 
a means of psychological salvation, a private religious 
realization (1921/1974, para. 326). 
The sociology of Durkheim and the psychology 
of Jung thus present respectively public and private 
approaches to religion. These approaches offer 
comprehensive and complementary systems as both 
thinkers seek to explain the social and psychological 
manifestations of religion, Durkheim through the 
collective consciousness and collective representations, 
and Jung through the collective unconscious and the 
archetypes. Their systems contain striking structural 
similarities noted by only a few scholars (Guala, 1970; 
Meštrović, 1985, 1988c; Progoff, 1953; Staude, 1976). 
To date no detailed textual analysis exists with which 
to substantiate the relationship between Durkheim’s 
and Jung’s ideas. This approach holds the potential for 
opening new theoretical applications in the sociology of 
religion. 
In suggesting the broad outlines of a proposed 
synthesis, as well as its practical applications, I present 
here: 1) a literature review of scholars who have analyzed 
both Durkheim and Jung; 2) a discussion of Durkheim’s 
and Jung’s biographies and common intellectual 
milieu to reveal some significant socio-cultural 
affinities; 3) a comparative analysis of Durkhem’s and 
Jung’s theories, which show a remarkable but little-
recognized congruence of religious thought stemming 
from the philosophy of Schopenhauer; and 4) a basis 
for structuring a transpersonal sociology of religion. 
“Transpersonal” refers to a simultaneously objective and 
subjective awareness and will be defined more fully later. 
A major feature of the present analysis is 
an emphasis on the socio-cultural context in which 
Durkheim and Jung wrote. Intellectual concerns at the 
turn of the century focused on representationalism and 
on the concept of the unconscious (Meštrović, 1988c, 
Keywords: collective consciousness, collective unconscious, transpersonal, representationalism, 
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International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 43Emile Durkheim and C. G. Jung
p. 94), often ignored in many analyses of Durkheim 
and Jung. The aim of this essay is to identify affinities 
in Durkheim’s and Jung’s approaches based on reading 
their works in proper historical context. 
The Work to Date 
The full implications of the striking similarities between Durkheim and Jung have remained largely 
unacknowledged in both sociology and psychology 
because no thorough effort has been made to link 
their theories. Such an effort becomes the first step in 
elucidating a transpersonal approach. Meštrović (1988c), 
whose charge for a “reformation of sociology” (p. 17), 
dictates a synthesis of both objective and subjective 
realities, has provided a sound foundation for this effort. 
Progoff (1953), Guala (1970), and Staude (1976) have 
also examined the Durkheim-Jung connection. 
Progoff (1953) wrote that Jung, indebted to the 
sociological concepts of Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl, 
adopted Durkheim’s basic concept of the “collective 
representations” (p. 176). Progoff contributed to an 
understanding of the social nature of Jung’s collective 
unconscious by recognizing that to Jung “the social is 
essentially the unconscious” (p. 163). 
Guala (1970) offered an analysis of Jung’s 
archetypes, Durkheim’s collective representations, and 
Levi-Strauss’s models and functions. While concluding 
that Durkheim and Jung are joined semantically, Guala 
observed that they remain apart “by the different levels of 
their reasoning” (p. 131). In ignoring the presence of the 
unconscious in Durkheim’s work (as noted by Meštrović, 
1984), Guala failed to perceive that the unconscious is 
an essential link between Durkheim and Jung. 
In attempting to move from “depth psychology to 
depth sociology,” Staude (1976, pp. 314-318) has claimed 
that to appreciate Jung’s concern with the collective 
nature of both consciousness and the unconscious, one 
must be aware of his debts to Durkheim, Hubert, and 
the French sociological school. Staude believed that 
Jung’s definition of the collective unconscious indicates 
a collective, transpersonal dimension in the individual 
psyche, a subjective counterpart to Durkheim’s collective 
consciousness. The intricacies of the objective and the 
subjective may be more clearly understood through the 
word transpersonal, which I will discuss shortly. Finally, 
Guala made no reference to Progoff, nor did Staude to 
either Progoff or Guala.
The word transpersonal needs to be explained 
more fully. Following Wilber’s (1984) terminology and 
Meštrović’s (1987) presentation of Marcel Mauss’s “‘total’ 
social fact as a phenomenon that includes the sociological, 
psychological, and physiological dimensions . . . 
simultaneously” (p. 567), I suggest that a transpersonal 
perspective implies that religion should be experienced 
simultaneously in its social and psychological aspects, 
and that these aspects are not mutually exclusive. 
This perspective, superseding the limitations imposed 
by traditional sociological analyses, fulfills Wilber’s 
proclamation (1984) that “a ‘transpersonal sociology’ is 
a discipline desperately awaiting birth” (p. 106). 
The word transpersonal, in suggesting the 
validity of both objective and subjective forms of 
religious realization, moves beyond semantics; it implies 
simultaneous sociological and psychological, or exoteric 
and esoteric, awareness. We might even say transpersonal 
demands an integrational imperative in that all aspects 
of a religious experience must be brought to conscious 
awareness in order to be understood fully. While 
transpersonal is linked stylistically with the modern 
era, in actuality it contains much the same meaning as 
nineteenth-century representationalism. 
Representationalism and Religion 
Representationalism suggests that the human mind can apprehend objects only through ideas which 
represent those objects (Flew, 1984, p. 305; Meštrović, 
1988c). Schopenhauer (1818/1969) promoted the use 
of this concept and probably provided a common 
intellectual foundation for Durkheim’s explicit and 
Jung’s implicit concepts of homo duplex (Meštrović, 
1985, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1989a, 1989b), as well as 
for Durkheim’s (1897/1951) and Jung’s (1921/1974) 
descriptions of psychological types.2 
Representationalism allowed Durkheim to 
eschew the extremes of the long-standing object-subject 
distinction through his stated reconciliation of classical 
empiricism and apriorism (Durkheim, 1912/1965, p. 
31; Meštrović, 1985, 1989b, p. 263). Durkheim and his 
followers labeled their sociology renovated rationalism, 
the implications of which are central to Durkheim’s 
explanation of religious phenomena. 
Durkheim (1897/1951) writes, “Religion is in a 
word the system of symbols by means of which society 
becomes conscious of itself; it is the characteristic way 
of thinking of collective existence” (p. 312). Later 
he amplifies, “At bottom, the concept of totality, that 
of society and that of divinity are very probably only 
different aspects of the same notion” (1912/1965, p. 490). 
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Thus a Durkheimian interpretation of symbols would 
include not only the objective manifestation, a totem for 
example, but also the subjective realization that a totem 
reflects a society’s consciousness of itself as an entity sui 
generis (pp. 235-237). 
With this discussion, then, we can begin to 
appreciate the idea that the sociological aspect of a 
transpersonal approach also contains its opposite, a 
psychological awareness. To ignore the presence of 
opposites, the objective and subjective or the seen and the 
unseen, within the single reality—the totem—indicates 
a one-dimensional religious understanding. 
Similarly, Jung’s (1934/1980) “transcendent 
function” (para. 524) implies use of representationalism, 
again a mediation of the object-subject distinction. The 
transcendent function, in bridging the gulf between 
conscious and unconscious functions, uses both rational 
(the real or objective) and irrational (the imaginary or 
subjective) categories. It manifests itself in the appearance 
of symbols, which often possess religious significance. 
Jung (1938/1969) perceived the union of opposites as 
a form of psychological salvation, an incarnation of 
the divine in the human: “The self, as a totality, is . . 
. indistinguishable from a God-image” (para. 232-233). 
This concept allows us to employ the psychological 
aspect, the unconscious or subjective, of a transpersonal 
approach while also realizing the presence of its opposite, 
a sociological or conscious awareness.
Thus, Jung’s transcendent function mediates 
conscious and unconscious religious factors within the 
psyche, and similarly, Durkheim’s renovated rationalism 
mediates conscious and unconscious religious 
factors within society. Considered simultaneously, 
Durkheim’s and Jung’s approaches reveal the necessity 
of a transpersonal approach to religion: Without it, to 
paraphrase the Gospel according to Matthew, we will see 
without seeing, hear without hearing. 
An examination of Durkheim’s and Jung’s focus 
upon religion through the relevant literature makes 
clearer their roles in developing a transpersonal sociology 
of religion. I am by no means able to summarize here 
the full extent of their treatment of religion, but I will 
attempt to suggest avenues for future investigations. 
The important point is that both Durkheim and Jung 
share fin de siecle philosophical assumptions derived, 
directly or indirectly, from Schopenhauer. Because their 
understandings of human nature and representationalism 
have not been apprehended in the socio-cultural context 
in which they wrote, the full extent of their intellectual 
affinities has been underappreciated. To understand 
the role of religion in their works, we must exercise, as 
Mills (1959) demands, our “sociological imagination 
[which] enables us to grasp history and biography and 
the relations between the two within society” (p. 6). 
The Religious and Intellectual Milieux 
Despite being the sons of clergy, both Durkheim, born in France in 1857, and Jung, born in Switzerland 
in 1875, appeared bored and repelled by formal religion 
(Pickering, 1984; Wehr, 1985/1987). Durkheim came 
to emphasize religion’s moral benefits for society, while 
Jung turned inward to explore numinous events, or those 
having some mystical or holy significance. Durkheim 
(1912/1965) wrote: 
This division of the world into two domains, the 
one containing all that is sacred, the other all that is 
profane, is the distinctive trait of religious thought; 
the beliefs, myths, dogmas and legends are either 
representations or systems of representations which 
express the nature of sacred things. (p. 52)
Thus Durkheim stresses the importance of the concept 
of representation: Representations signify the underlying 
reality at the same time that they are a “reality” 
(subjectively) in their own right. For Durkheim, this 
reality is the nature sui generis of a religious collective 
consciousness. 
Jung (1938/1969) wrote: 
To many people it may seem strange that a doctor 
with a scientific training should interest himself in 
the Trinity at all. But anyone who has experienced 
how closely and meaningfully these representations 
collectives are bound up with the weal and woe of 
the human soul will readily understand that the 
central symbol of Christianity must have, above all 
else, a psychological meaning. (para. 171)
  
Acknowledgment of both conscious and unconscious 
elements within each person thus becomes a means of 
psychological salvation, a private religious realization 
(Jung, 1921/1974, para. 326). The above passages are 
not isolated quotations about religion but illustrate 
continuous themes that interested Durkheim and Jung. 
With regard to Durkheim, Pickering (1984) 
has written, “The alleged mysticism which was said to 
have engulfed his concept of society and his approach 
to collective representations had associated with them 
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mysterious qualities which were not far removed from the 
divine” (p. 8). Meštrović (1988c) believes that Durkheim 
was always concerned with religion. Wehr (1985/1987) 
has written that, including Psychological Types, almost all 
of Jung’s works in the second half of his life featured 
religion: “Jung’s object, in fact, was nothing less than to 
build a spiritual bridge between traditional dogma and 
immediate experience” (p. 299). 
Durkheim thus focused his attention upon 
religion as manifested in social experience, while Jung 
emphasized religion as revealed by the inner world of 
the psyche. Meštrović (1984) has countered the mid-
twentieth-century implication that Durkheim had no use 
for psychology, observing that Durkheim (1924/1974) 
stated unequivocally, “Collective psychology is sociology” 
(p. 34). At the Ecole Normale Superieure in Paris, 
Durkheim found among his classmates, characterized as 
the best and brightest of a generation (Lukes, 1972, pp. 
44-45), the psychologist Pierre Janet. This association 
with Janet was one of many such contacts, and it led to 
interesting connections with Freud’s work. 
Bellah (1973) has called attention to “significant 
parallels with Freud, since Durkheim was trying to 
understand the unconscious sources of social existence as 
Freud was the unconscious sources of personal existence” 
(p. liv). Staude (1976) has discussed the “progressive 
development in the theory of the unconscious from 
Freud, through Jung, to Levi-Strauss” (p. 334). Meštrović 
(1982, 1988a, p. 171, 1988b, p. 70, 1988c, p. 49) has 
carefully detailed Freud’s many references to Durkheim 
and his followers. Even more significantly, Meštrović 
(1984) has substantiated the infrequently recognized 
role of the unconscious in Durkheim’s concepts. Jones 
(1986) has also pointed out that between 1897 and 1898, 
Durkheim evinced “increased interest in the psychology 
of the unconscious” (p. 617). Thus Durkheim’s use 
of the unconscious appears to be a relatively recent 
“discovery,” while Freud’s use of the unconscious has 
been commonplace information since he first published. 
Both Freud, Jung’s mentor, and Janet studied 
under Jean Paul Charcot, a prominent neurologist at the 
Salpetriere Hospital in Paris, and both were influenced 
by his work on the psychology of neurotic states.3 
Meštrović has cited Janet as an important conduit of 
Schopenhauerian philosophy into French psychology. 
Indeed, Meštrović (1982, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1989a, 
1989b) places Freud and Durkheim in the stream of 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Jung too acknowledged a 
debt to Schopenhauer as evidenced by his numerous 
citations to the philosopher (Forryan & Glover, 1979, 
pp. 598-599; Staude 1976, p. 318). 
Another link between Durkheim and Jung is 
found in the work of Levy-Bruhl, the anthropologist. 
Lukes (1972, p. 294) has noted that Durkheim 
corresponded with Levy-Bruhl. Meštrović (1988c) writes 
that Levy-Bruhl, “an intimate friend of both Durkheim 
and Jung (according to Levy-Bruhl’s granddaughter), 
may have cross-fertilized several schools in Europe at the 
time” (p. 99). Jung (1934/1980, para. 5) acknowledged 
that his concept of archetypes and Levy-Bruhl’s 
representations collectives were one and the same. 
All of these personal and intellectual 
connections suggest that commonalities of thought 
abounded around the fin de siecle and reveal Durkheim’s 
and Jung’s theoretical interdependence in describing 
religious phenomena. Religion, therefore, appears 
highly significant for both Durkheim and Jung in their 
private and public lives, in the individual and collective 
representations that influenced their work. This 
acknowledgment completes another step in the process 
of understanding the development of a transpersonal 
sociology of religion.4 Yet we must consider another 
related factor, that of translation, in dealing with 
interpretations of Durkheim’s ideas. 
The Translation Factor
Durkheim wrote in French, Jung in German. Controversy over translation has not yet surfaced 
with Jung as it has with Durkheim. Scholars discussing 
Durkheim’s conscience collective must address the 
translation factor: The single French word conscience 
translates into English either as “conscience” or as 
“consciousness.” Lalande (1928), who moved in the 
same circles as Durkheim, compiled a dictionary of the 
then-current usage of philosophical terms. He (pp. 127-
128) offered first a psychological meaning for conscience 
and found it akin to the German words Bewusstsein and 
Selbstbewusstsein, and to the English word consciousness. 
Second, he listed a moral meaning, akin to the German 
word Gewissen and to the English word “conscience.” 
Thus some scholars (e.g., Meštrović, 1985) 
have chosen the original French phrase. Others (e.g., 
Halls, as cited in Durkheim, 1895/1982) have used the 
English word consciousness, and still others (e.g., Lukes 
1972), conscience. Some (e.g., Traugott, 1978) have even 
alternated between the two English words, depending 
upon their interpretation of the particular section.           
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Bohannon wrote that no one used ambiguity 
with greater effect than did Durkheim (Wolff, 1960, 
p. 78). Lukes (1972) cited five different ways in which 
Durkheim used the word “society” (p. 21). Is it possible 
that Durkheim’s thought holds a flexibility and a beauty 
through this very ambiguity? Perhaps sociology, having 
produced, as Mills (1959) observed, the extremes of grand 
theory and abstracted empiricism, has now matured 
enough to find the balance between these polarities of 
the sociological continuum. 
I suggest that a Jungian reading of Durkheim, 
and a Durkheimian reading of Jung, promotes this 
balance and provides yet another way to apply a 
transpersonal perspective through intellectual flexibility; 
in essence, we can overlay one approach while reading 
another. To facilitate this process further, I will now 
explore Durkheim’s collective consciousness and Jung’s 
collective unconscious. 
The Collective Consciousness and the Collective 
Unconscious 
Jung is well known for his work on the unconscious, but few scholars have acknowledged the presence 
of the unconscious within Durkheim’s work, as noted 
earlier. Although Durkheim (1924/1974) referred to 
sociology as collective psychology, the psychological 
implications have been largely ignored by sociologists. 
Likewise, the sociological implications of Jung’s work 
have been neglected by psychologists. Collins (1988a) 
has used Staude’s explication of Jung’s theory to 
explain life transitions, but in general social scientists 
remain unaware of Jung’s relevance in understanding 
Durkheim’s explanation of religion, as manifested by the 
collective consciousness. 
Let us turn first to the definitions used by the 
authors themselves. Durkheim (1893/1984) characterized 
the collective consciousness thus: 
The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the 
average members of a society forms a determinate 
system with a life of its own. By definition, it is 
diffused over society as a whole. . . . It does not 
change with every generation but, on the contrary, 
links successive generations to one another. . . . It is 
the psychological type of society. (pp. 38-39)
 
For Jung (1934/1980), the collective unconscious is a 
“psychic system of a collective, universal, and impersonal 
nature which is identical in all individuals. This 
collective unconscious does not develop individually 
but is inherited. It consists of pre-existent forms, the 
archetypes” (para. 90). 
The collective consciousness appears to 
represent society, but as Durkheim points out, it is 
only a representation, or a perception, of the totality of 
society. Its unconscious aspects remain hidden, while its 
conscious, social aspects appear more obvious in such 
social facts as laws, statistics, and religious beliefs. As 
Meštrović (1984) has explained, Durkheim repeatedly 
emphasized, especially through reference to Janet, the 
role of unconscious mental factors.
Janet’s influence appears obvious in Jung’s 
formulation of the collective unconscious (e.g., Jung, 
1934/1980, para. 490). Although the collective 
unconscious is hidden from consciousness, it represents 
the totality of the psyche. The collective unconscious 
manifests itself in dreams, symbols, and behavior that 
contain identifiable archetypes or primordial images. 
These images contributed to the ancient mythologies, 
which in time became part of many religious systems. 
To understand more precisely how the collective 
consciousness and the collective unconscious function, 
we must turn to their respective components, the 
collective representations and the archetypes.
Collective Representation and Archetypes 
By turning to the concepts of collective representations and archetypes, we retrace the steps followed by 
both Durkheim and Jung, who first described the overall 
structures, the collective consciousness and the collective 
unconscious, and then the respective components 
within the structures. Like the collective consciousness 
and the collective unconscious, Durkheim’s collective 
representations and Jung’s archetypes possess both 
sociological and psychological aspects as well as the 
common element of the unconscious. 
Durkheim’s (1895/1964) first methodological 
rule suggests that we “treat social facts as things” (p. 
14). In other words, as Pickering (1984, p. 153, p. 224) 
has noted, the sacred as social fact is a thing-in-itself, 
but it always appears as a representation symbolizing an 
underlying reality. Durkheim (1895/1964) wrote, “We 
must, therefore, consider social phenomena in themselves 
as distinct from the consciously formed representations 
of them in the mind” (p. 28). He noted that Janet proved 
“that many acts, while bearing all the signs of being 
conscious, are not in fact so” (Durkheim, 1924/1974, 
p. 20). Acts are thus both conscious and unconscious. 
Meštrović (1984) has noted, “Durkheim regarded 
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social facts as a type of collective representation whose 
reality eludes the consciousness of agents, witnesses, 
and society itself” (p. 268). What indeed are collective 
representations, how are they related to archetypes, and 
why is a knowledge of both essential to a transpersonal 
sociology of religion? 
In exploring the concepts of collective 
representations and archetypes, we may first assume that 
the unconscious plays a key role. Ambiguity remains 
an ever-present factor, since we can never fully know 
another’s motives or even our own. We may observe 
the manifestations of the unconscious, as Durkheim 
(1895/1964) pointed out, through social facts, or as Jung 
(1921/1974, para. 814-829) pointed out, through the 
process of symbol-formation. Second, we can examine 
the words that Durkheim and Jung used to describe 
collective representations and archetypes. Consider, 
for example, Durkheim’s (1924/1974) statement that 
representations are “partially autonomous realities 
with . . . the power to attract and repel each other” (p. 
31). Collective representations are thus characterized 
by a synthetic process. This process, embodying the 
psycho-sociological aspect of the transpersonal, creates 
sui generis social forces from the association of private 
sentiments (p. 26).
As Durkheim (1912/1965, p. 25, p. 94) later 
noted, mythologies provide a source of religious beliefs, 
or representations, which leave “an indelible trace” and 
which illustrate the most fundamental and collective 
aspects of a society. He identified these collective 
representations as: 
the result of an immense cooperation, which stretches 
out not only into space but into time as well: to make 
them a multitude of minds have associated, united 
and combined their ideas and sentiments; for them, 
long generations have accumulated their experience 
and their knowledge. (p. 29) 
This accumulated knowledge resulting in religious 
collective representations is also implicit in Jung’s 
description of archetypes. Compare Durkheim’s 
statement with Jung’s (1961/1965) description: 
Archetypal statements are based upon instinctive 
preconditions. . . . They have always been part of the 
world scene—representations collectives, as Levy 
Bruhl rightly called them. . . . Practical consideration 
of these processes is the essence of religion, insofar 
as religion can be approached from a psychological 
point of view. (para. 353) 
Jung (1912/1956) further stated, “It is a 
psychological fact that the archetype can seize hold of 
the ego and compel it to act as the archetype wills” (para. 
101). Commonality with Durkheim seems obvious, as 
both describe a similar phenomenon. Jung (1928/1966) 
echoed Durkheim’s description of the synthetic process 
of forming collective representations when he stated 
that the symbols of the collective unconscious, to be 
understood on an individual level, must be “subjected to 
a synthetic mode of treatment” (para. 122). 
Specifically, the synthetic mode of treatment 
requires the opposing states of the psyche to “face one 
another in the fullest conscious opposition . . . while the 
ego is forced to acknowledge its absolute  participation 
in both” (Jung, 1921/1974, para. 824). Such work 
activates the “transcendent function” (para. 825), which 
brings about a middle ground where the opposites 
can be united. Since the psyche contains the constant 
dynamic of tension between opposites, their “union” 
signifies conscious awareness, inasmuch as possible, of 
unconscious material. This description clearly illustrates 
the social-psychological aspects of a transpersonal 
perspective. 
Jung’s description of psychological facts 
resembles Durkheim’s social facts or collective 
representations (see Meštrović, 1988c, p. 95, for an 
elaboration of the unconscious within social facts). 
Durkheim (1924/1974), in discussing the basis for 
collective representations, wrote that psychic phenomena 
“make themselves apparent by their characteristic 
signs of . . . hesitation [and] tentativeness” (p. 20). His 
words bear an uncanny resemblance to those of Jung 
(1938/1969), who stated that unconscious factors, or 
archetypes, can cause reactions to be “delayed, altered, 
suppressed, or replaced by autonomous intruders” (para. 
21). Both collective representations and archetypes 
contain unconscious factors so that they can never be 
known in entirety to humans. Both exert a compulsion 
upon humans and affect behavior in bizarre ways. 
Further explanation lies in Jung’s (1928/1966) 
suggestion that the self prefigures the “God within 
us,” since the self represents a psychological concept 
expressing an unknowable essence which can “thwart 
our will . . . obsess our consciousness . . . and . . . 
influence our moods and action” (para. 400). Jung 
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echoes Durkheim’s emphasis on the divine as social 
necessity by admonishing us not to leave out the divine 
when considering autonomous contents, since the divine 
is a psychological necessity. By affixing the attribute 
“divine” to the workings of autonomous contents, we are 
admitting their relatively superior force (para. 403). 
In tracing the historical usage of the concept of 
archetypes, Jung (1934/1980, para. 5, para. 89) described 
archetypes as “universal images that have existed since the 
remotest times” similar to Platonic forms. He cited Levy-
Bruhl’s representations collectives, as well as Hubert’s 
and Mauss’s categories of the imagination. In addition, he 
listed Usener’s unconscious thinking, Bastian’s elementary 
ideas, Kant’s doctrine of categories, St. Augustine’s ideae 
principales, and Philo Judaeus’s and Irenaeus’s Imago Dei 
(God-image). The Corpus Hermeticum’s God is archetypal 
light. Jung also observed that the familiar characters in 
fairy tales, such as the witch or the trickster, represent 
archetypes. Thus Durkheim’s collective representations 
and Jung’s archetypes appear to possess a similar 
conceptual foundation. Although Durkheim’s use of 
collective representations has generally been dropped 
in favor of “social facts,” we must remember that the 
category of collective representations subsumes social 
facts, including their psychological, subjective dimension 
(Meštrović, 1985). 
     Collective representations manifest themselves 
especially in religions and in mythologies containing 
“vast systems of representations” which “far from 
being engraven through all eternity upon the mental 
constitution of men . . . depend, at least in part, upon 
factors that are historical and consequently social” 
(Durkheim, 1912/1965, p. 25). Durkheim’s collective 
representations appear to have their origins in distant 
time, but because of their synthetic nature and ability to 
form and reform, specific collective representations exert 
a time-limited effect upon humans. Yet this effect may 
exhibit great power, a power in part due to unconscious 
factors. 
Again, let us remember that collective 
representations, while unfamiliar to modern day 
sociologists, was a commonplace term in fin de siecle 
society (Janik & Toulmin, 1973; Meštrović, 1985). Jung 
(1934/1980) explained that collective representations, 
described by Levy-Bruhl in primitive tribal lore, have 
been modified from unconscious to “conscious formulae 
. . . generally in the form of esoteric teaching. This last 
is a typical means of expression for the transmission 
of collective contents originally derived from the 
unconscious” (para. 5). As with Durkheim, ambiguity 
appears in this statement as we attempt to determine the 
similarities between Jung’s archetypes and Durkheim’s 
collective representations. 
Through the preceding comparative analysis, I 
conclude that Durkheim and Jung are indeed describing 
the same process, and that through acknowledgement 
of the similarity, we can complete yet another step in 
analyzing religion from a transpersonal perspective. 
Toward a Transpersonal Sociology of Religion 
For Durkheim, religion revealed the organization of society through the collective consciousness and the 
collective representations, which together provide social 
organization and enable society to become aware of itself. 
Analogously, religion for Jung revealed the organization 
of the self through the collective unconscious and the 
archetypes, which together provide self-organization 
and enable the self to become aware of its psychological 
totality. With this brief review, I am ready to suggest 
directions for a transpersonal sociology of religion. 
Transpersonal, as defined earlier, addresses the 
ambiguities in both Durkheim’s and Jung’s concepts 
of religious phenomena. In so doing, it incorporates 
traditional sociological analysis within a framework that 
recognizes the validity of unconscious factors. We still 
have difficulty today escaping from an overly rationalistic 
mind-set stemming from the Enlightenment. Meštrović 
(1984), for example, has written that the positivistic 
tradition has neglected Durkheim’s use of the 
unconscious. Yet as Meštrović (1988c, p. 77) has clearly 
demonstrated, the unconscious cannot be divorced from 
scientific endeavors. 
Perhaps transpersonal aptly fits a description 
of religious phenomena in a post-Enlightenment era, 
as we begin to incorporate subjective ways of knowing 
into the objective, positivistic tradition. In other 
words, transpersonal suggests a methodology by which 
unconscious factors may be studied simultaneously as 
psychological and social facts. Ideally, transpersonal 
could signify a new type of “enlightened” consciousness 
by suggesting a synthesis of what are usually considered 
antithetical elements—Durkheim’s sociology and Jung’s 
psychology—through awareness of the psychological 
aspects of the collective consciousness and of the 
sociological aspects of the collective unconscious. 
A possible origin of the seemingly antithetical 
relationship between social and psychological facts lies 
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within two Latin roots of the word “religion.” Rather 
than being an abstruse exercise, these etymologies 
highlight the underlying unity behind the surface 
differences in Durkheim’s sociological and Jung’s 
psychological approaches to religion and, in so doing, 
help to structure a transpersonal perspective. 
The early Christian Fathers’ emphasis upon the 
binding nature of religion (Jung, 1938/1969, para. 982) 
appears to reflect Durkheim’s concern with the socially 
binding nature of religious rites and, as Meštrović (1988c) 
has outlined, the obligatory morality that Durkheim’s 
vision of religion implies. This meaning is exemplified 
in religare, the preferred primitive root of religion, 
which carries the connotation of “obligation” (Lewis & 
Short, 1879/1975, p. 1556) or “binding” (Coser 1977, 
p. 138). This meaning appears to capture the essence of 
many contemporary sociological approaches to religion 
which provide an objective description of religious 
participation. 
In contrast, let us examine the word religion 
from Jung’s perspective. Jung emphasized reverence 
and fear of archetypal religious forces operating on an 
intuitive level beyond the five senses. This meaning is 
embodied in religio, a “reverence for God (the gods), 
the fear of God, connected with a careful pondering 
of divine things” (Berger, 1969, p. 27; Lewis & Short, 
1879/1975). Jung (1938/1969) added that religio means 
“a careful observation and taking account of . . . the 
numinous” (para. 982). A transpersonal approach thus 
offers the possibility of a reconciliation between what 
many people believe to be mutually exclusive forms of 
religion, shown in part by Luckmann’s (1967) invisible 
or private religion (akin to religio), which seeks to 
dissociate itself from public church organization (akin 
to religare). We might even identify the transpersonal 
process as a divine dialectic which synthesizes these 
forms of religion. 
As we continue to transcend the strictly 
sociological level of analysis, a Durkheimian-Jungian 
consideration of symbols further develops the 
transpersonal perspective. In recalling the previously 
mentioned example of Durkheim’s totem, let us 
substitute the cross for the totem. The cross appears 
as a visible symbol of the collective consciousness to a 
community of worshippers. The visible symbol is an 
objective manifestation, but it also represents within 
each worshipper a subjective realization of the group’s 
consciousness of itself. This realization is emancipatory 
in that both the objective and subjective natures of 
the cross are understood simultaneously and that such 
understanding demonstrates that the objective and 
subjective are not mutually exclusive.5 
Jung (1921/1974) described the opposition of 
the psychological functions of sensation/intuition and 
thinking/feeling as comprising the core of the psyche, 
a symbolic cross. He (1946/1969, para. 523) saw the 
psyche as literally at “cross purposes” with itself by 
virtue of the struggle of these “warring” functions. The 
four functions exist in consciousness as well as in the 
unconscious, depending on the preferential hierarchy 
in each individual psyche. The two lesser-preferred 
functions become part of one’s shadow, the shadow 
being an archetype of the collective unconscious (Jung, 
1934/1980, para. 44). Jung (1946/1969) concluded, 
“The cross as a form of suffering expresses psychic 
reality” (para. 523). The anguish of coming to terms 
with opposing functions ultimately reconciles them by 
bringing them to conscious awareness. Literally, the 
ego is crucified and then resurrected to psychological 
wholeness (Jung, 1955/1984, para. 1664). 
As with a Durkheimian interpretation of 
the cross, the objective (the conscious psychological 
functions) struggles with the subjective (the unconscious 
psychological functions) in order that reconciliation take 
place. This reconciliation resembles that achieved by 
Durkheim’s renovated rationalism and Jung’s analytic 
psychology with each theorist’s emphasis on empirical 
as well as intuitive data. Thus a transpersonal approach 
unifies both the sociological objective and subjective 
and the psychological objective and subjective.
This approach will be the direction of my 
future research as I attempt to extend, through a focus 
on religion, Durkheim’s (1950/1957) search for a science 
of moral facts. Toward this goal I shall investigate 
a possible common philosophical heritage for both 
sociology and modern Christian mysticism through 
several theoretical treatments of perception (e.g., Jung’s 
distinction between intuition and sensation). 
The preceding examples suggest the possibility 
of fruitful research not only in the sociology of religion 
but also in the larger body of sociological theory when 
the latter may involve religious considerations. I shall 
briefly mention two ideas. First, in the sociology of 
religion a transpersonal perspective could extend the 
focus of the comparative method by adding the more 
micro component of collective representations and 
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archetypes to the usual macro approach. The macro 
approach, rather than employing only the traditional 
structural analysis, would include the collective 
consciousness and the collective unconscious. 
Use of a transpersonal comparative methodology 
might reveal as yet unrecognized connections between 
Western religions, traditionally more outwardly 
or sociologically focused, and Eastern religions, 
traditionally more inwardly or psychologically focused. 
This analysis, through inclusion of unconscious factors, 
would transcend the frequently one-dimensional or 
positivistic approach of the functionalist, conflict, and 
interactionist perspectives. 
Second, the continuing discussion over macro-
micro issues provides an arena for theoretical applications 
of a Durkheimian-Jungian approach. Although Collins 
(1988b) has repeated the standard, anti-psychological 
interpretations of Durkheim, he nevertheless works with 
a conciliatory spirit to resolve differences between macro- 
and micro-sociological views. The incorporation of a 
Durkheimian-Jungian framework in the macro-micro 
debate could reveal artificially constructed boundaries 
designed, albeit unconsciously, to buttress a researcher’s 
theoretical position. These boundaries could be exposed 
by Durkheim’s collective consciousness, a macro entity 
containing a micro entity, the collective representations, 
and by Jung’s collective unconscious, a macro entity 
containing a micro entity, the archetypes. In addition, 
a Durkheimian-Jungian approach could strengthen 
Collins’s (1988b) meso theories (e.g., network analysis 
and organizational theory applied to religious factors), 
which articulate his proposed rapprochement between 
macro and micro issues. 
In summary, Durkheim’s collective conscious-
ness and collective representations reveal the social 
manifestations of religion with psychological implications. 
Jung’s archetypes and collective unconscious reveal the 
psychological manifestations of religion with social 
implications. Thus the structuring of a transpersonal 
sociology of religion suggests a synthesis of Durkheim’s 
and Jung’s own individual syntheses. It provides a whole 
greater than the sum of its parts and the beginnings of a 
new approach to which others may contribute their ideas. 
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 Notes
1.    Durkheimian scholars differ on the translation of the 
French phrase conscience collective. I have chosen 
collective consciousness to indicate both moral and 
perceptual meanings. 
2.  In Suicide (1897/1951) and in other works, Durkheim 
describes psychological counterparts to his social 
categories. His nephew and collaborator, Marcel Mauss, 
argued that Durkheimian sociology presupposes a 
psychology, particularly the psychologies of Wilhelm 
Wundt in Germany and Theodule Ribot in France. In 
turn, both Wundt and Ribot were heavily influenced 
by Schopenhauer (Meštrović, 1988c, p. 48). Staude 
(1976, p. 316) refers to Jung’s “teacher” Schopenhauer. 
3.      Janet developed the concept of the abaissement du 
niveau mental, a lowering of the mental level. The 
concept found its way into 12 of Jung’s books (Forryan 
& Glover, 1979, p. 3). This was no coincidence, since 
Janet was Jung’s supervisor when Jung interned at the 
Salpetriere in 1904-05.
4.   The aforementioned theoretical interdependence 
is related to and promotes an understanding of the 
applicability of critical theory, particularly Habermas’s 
(1968/1971) concept of emancipatory interest, as 
briefly discussed later in this paper. 
5.   This approach also enhances some versions of 
postmodern social philosophy, in particular, 
Habermas’s work in critical theory. Critical theory 
has its roots in the so-called Frankfurt School and 
draws largely upon Marx and Freud (Held, 1980). A 
member of the “second generation” of critical theorists, 
Habermas (1968/1971) built upon their foundations. 
He developed a cognitive emancipatory interest to 
show that “the self-formative process . . . depends 
on the contingent conditions of both subjective and 
objective nature” (p. 210). Analysis of self-realization 
uses subjective socialization experiences as well as 
objective “material exchange” communications. 
Through emphasis on emancipation, a deepening 
of the traditional sociological approach of “looking 
behind the scenes,” critical theory thus moves closer 
to a transpersonal perspective.
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